



**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
BEAUMONT DIVISION**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**v.**

**LUIS HERNANDEZ-HERNANDEZ**

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**CASE NO. 1:11-CR-82**

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLEA OF TRUE  
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Local Rules for the District Court, Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred this matter for hearing and the submission of findings of fact and a report and recommendation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401(i) and 3583(e). The United States alleges that Defendant, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez, violated conditions of supervised release imposed by United States District Judge Wiley Y. Daniel of the District of Colorado. The United States Probation Office filed its *First Amended Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision* requesting the revocation of the defendant's supervised release.

The Court conducted a hearing on August 30, 2011, in accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, 32 and 32.1. Defendant was present and represented by counsel at the

hearing. Having heard the evidence, this court factually finds that the defendant has violated conditions of supervision and recommends that such violation warrants the revocation of his supervised release.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the Court finds:

a. That Defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the plea of true in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.

b. That Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, that his plea of true is a knowing and voluntary plea, not the result of force or threats, and that the plea is supported by an independent evidentiary basis in fact establishing each of the essential elements of the conduct.

### **STATEMENT OF REASONS**

#### **A. Procedural History**

On April 13, 2005, The Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel, United States District Judge for the District of Colorado, sentenced Hernandez-Hernandez after he pled guilty to the offense of assault on a correctional officer, a Class C felony. Judge Wiley sentenced the defendant to 84 months imprisonment followed by three years supervised release subject to the standard conditions of release, plus special conditions to include deportation; drug aftercare; intoxicants total abstinence; and a \$100 special assessment. On February 12, 2011, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez was released from prison and on March 10, 2011, he was deported to Mexico.

On July 1, 2011, jurisdiction over this case was transferred from the District of Colorado to the Eastern District of Texas. The proceeding is now assigned to the docket of United States District Judge Thad Heartfield.

**B. Allegations in Petition**

The United States alleges that the defendant violated the following mandatory condition of supervised release:

*The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.*

Specifically, on or about March 10, 2011, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez was deported to Mexico. On or about June 14, 2011, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez was arrested by the Brownsville Police Department on the charge of public intoxication, after he illegally reentered the United States.

**C. Evidence presented at Hearing:**

At the hearing, the Government offered the following evidence as its factual basis for the allegations set out *supra*. If the case proceeded to a contested hearing, the Government would offer evidence establishing that on or about March 10, 2011, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez was deported. The Government would also show that on or about June 14, 2011, the defendant was found in the United States after illegally re-entering when he was arrested by the Brownsville Police Department on charges of public intoxication.

Defendant, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez, offered a plea of true to the allegations. Specifically, Mr. Hernandez-Hernandez agreed with the evidence presented and pled true to the allegation that he committed another crime by re-entering the United States illegally and by being arrested for public intoxication in violation of his supervision conditions.

#### **D. Sentencing Guidelines; Findings and Recommended Disposition**

The allegations, supporting evidence and plea of true warrant revocation of supervised release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Court factually finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a mandatory condition of his supervised release by committing another crime while on supervised release.

If the Court finds that Hernandez-Hernandez violated his supervision conditions in the manner stated above, this will constitute a Grade C violation under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a). Upon finding a Grade C violation, the Court may revoke the defendant's supervised release. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2). Based upon the defendant's criminal history category of VI and the Grade C violation, the Sentencing Guidelines suggest a sentence of imprisonment for a period ranging from eight (8) to fourteen (14) months. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Because the original offense of conviction in this case was a Class C felony, the statutory maximum imprisonment term upon revocation is two years, less any time the defendant has already served in prison for a previous revocation. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

If the Court revokes a defendant's term of supervision and orders the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment for that revocation, the Court may also require that the defendant be placed on a new term of supervised release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). The length of this term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense which resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release. *Id.* Based on the original offense, the maximum term of supervised release that may be imposed in this revocation proceeding is not more than three years.

The Fifth Circuit states that Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the revocation of supervised release is advisory only. *See United States v. Cade*, 279 F.3d 265, 271 n.2 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) (citing *United States v. Montez*, 952 F.2d 854, 859 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992); *United States v. Headrick*, 963 F.2d 777, 782 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992)). Because Chapter 7 was promulgated as an advisory policy statement and there are no applicable guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised release<sup>1</sup>, the Court may impose a greater or lesser sentence upon revocation. *United States v. Gonzalez*, 250 F.3d 923, 925 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). Further, a sentence imposed for revocation will be upheld unless it is in violation of the law or plainly unreasonable. *Id.* *See also United States v. Pena*, 125 F.3d 285, 288 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Here, the evidence and the defendant's own admission supports a finding that he committed a new crime in violation of his supervision conditions. Mr. Hernandez-Hernandez voluntarily pled true, agreed with the Court's recommended sentence for that violation, and waived his right to allocute before the District Court. *See Consent to Revocation of Supervised Release and Waiver of Right to Be Present and Speak at Sentencing.*

Accordingly, based upon the defendant's plea of true, the agreement of the parties, and the evidence presented in this case, it is the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the District Court accept the plea of true and revoke Defendant's supervised release. The undersigned magistrate judge recommends that the District Court order Defendant to serve a term of **twelve (12) months imprisonment, to run consecutively to the term of imprisonment imposed for the revocation in cause number 1:02-CR-74**, also pending in the

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<sup>1</sup> *See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*, Ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 1 ("At this time, the Commission has chosen to promulgate policy statements only.")

Eastern District of Texas.

The Court further recommends that, upon his release from prison, Mr. Hernandez-Hernandez should be sentenced to a new term of **supervised release for twelve (12) months**. The new term of supervision should be subject to the following conditions:

“While on supervised release, the defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime, and shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by the Court, and shall comply with the following additional conditions:

As a condition of supervised release, immediately upon release from confinement, the defendant shall be surrendered to a duly authorized immigration official for deportation proceedings in accordance with the established procedures provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, *et seq.* If ordered deported, the defendant shall remain outside of the United States. In the event the defendant is not deported, or for any reason re-enters the country after having been deported, the defendant shall comply with all conditions of supervised release, to include reporting to the nearest U.S. Probation Office within 72 hours of release by immigration officials or re-entry into the country.”

### **OBJECTIONS**

Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party’s failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to *de novo* review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, *see Rodriguez v. Bowen*, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, *see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n.*, 79 F.3d 1415,

1417 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (en banc). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

**SIGNED this the 1st day of September, 2011.**

  
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KEITH F. GIBLIN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE